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This paper focuses on the role of the European Union (EU) in the formation of India’s 
climate change policy; an increasingly high profile issue area.  It is based on  an 
extensive study of relevant literature, EU-India policy documents and the execution 
of thirteen semi-structured interviews with experts; many of whom have experienced 
EU-India cooperation on climate change first-hand. A three-point typology will be 
used  to assess the extent of the EU’s  leadership role, supporting role or equal 
partnership role in India, with several sub-roles within these categories. Further, for 
clarity and chronology purposes, three time periods will be distinguished to assess 
how India’s climate policy has evolved over time, alongside the EU’s role within that. 
The findings of the paper confirm that the EU has demonstrated signs of all three roles 
to some degree, although the EU-India relationship in climate policy is increasingly an 
equal partnership. It offers explanations for previous shortcomings in EU-India climate 
policy as well as policy recommendations to help ensure more effective cooperation 
and implementation of policies.  
 Emily Murrell 
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Introduction: climate diplomacy and the EU’s role in the developing world 
 
The EU has increasingly recognised that emerging powers like India are “already key 
players in global politics, but it would nonetheless like to see them engaged to yet a 
greater degree in the global governance of the environment, notably when it 
comes to climate change”.1 Although EU-India relations date back to the early 1960s 
their cooperation has developed and gained a higher profile in recent years.2 It is 
important, however, to  acknowledge that their relations are still undergoing an 
evolutionary process. Despite effective collaboration in certain policy areas since the 
formalisation of their Strategic  Partnership in 2004,  and the start of the EU-India 
Summits in 2000, their cooperation has not been without difficulties; their relationship 
being often compared to a ‘loveless arranged marriage’.3 The commonalities and 
shared visions of the two partners (such as, democracy and respect for human rights) 
have not guaranteed successful cooperation.  
 
An often neglected area of discussion is EU-India collaboration on climate change 
policy. The focus on the EU’s dialogue with BRIC countries on a multilateral level has 
omitted its bilateral relations with the heterogeneous individual BRIC nations. Further, 
where research on EU-Asia relations has been conducted, it has tended to focus 
disproportionately on EU-China relations, or heavily politicised topical issues such as 
the EU-India negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This paper thus fills an 
important gap in current research; taking into consideration the broader context 
and evolution of the EU-India relationship while focusing specifically on climate 
change policy. So why does the EU want to influence India at all? Firstly, because the 
“protection of the environment is one of the EU’s major political commitments and 
aspect of its external relations actions”, demonstrated by its attempt to lead on the 
multilateral level at high-profile  United Nations Climate Change Conferences 
(UNCCCs)  and encourage a common approach internationally. 4  Secondly, 
cooperating with a key developing country also adheres to the EU’s broader 
                                                 
1 Schunz, Simon and Belis, David, “China, India and Global Environmental Governance: the 
Case of the Climate Change”, Policy Brief, no. 15, Leuven Centre for Global Governance 
Studies, Leuven University, March 2011, pp. 1-17. 
2 Kaucher, Linda,  “EU-India trade deal not yet in sight”, EurActiv.com, 10 February 2012, 
accessed 01/04/12, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/eu-india-trade-
deal-sight-news-510711. 
3 Khandekar, Gauri, “The EU and India: A Loveless Arranged Marriage”, FRIDE Policy Brief, no. 
90, August 2011, accessed 23/02/12, available at: www.fride.org. 
4 European Commission, “Regional Programming for Asia”, Strategy Document 2007-2013, 
Revision 1, 31 May 2007, p. 13, accessed 24/02/12, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/asia/ 
rsp/07_13_en.pdf. Emily Murrell 
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development agenda  and commitment  to the  Millennium Development Goals 
(applicable until 2015).  Given that “climate change is not only an environmental 
problem but also poses a clear risk to development if not addressed effectively”, 
there are many incentives for collaborating with India in this policy domain.5 The EU is 
recognised as one of the world’s largest donors of development assistance that is 
helping countries mitigate against the disastrous impacts of climate change which 
are expected to increase poverty levels are an important aspect of this.6 
 
This paper argues that the EU has demonstrated signs of all three roles in India: as a 
leader,  as a supporter and as an equal partner, all to a lesser or greater extent 
depending on the time period in question. The EU has found possessing a significant 
leadership role problematic – thus although acting as a necessary agenda setter 
and successfully encouraging India to up scale its commitment to international 
targets – it was nevertheless a modest role, challenged by India’s rising confidence 
and quest for international recognition. In terms of its supporting role, the EU 
demonstrated this most visibly in the second time phase by giving India financial and 
technical expertise through a rising number of dialogues and committees, 
expanding information sharing and best practice. Finally, this paper will show that 
the EU-India relationship has been progressively moving towards an equal 
partnership; the two actors increasingly working in a non-hierarchal and cooperative 
setting, co-financing projects and collaborating more on R&D. Overall, the EU has 
moved from a minor leadership role in phase one, to an equal partner role in phase 
three, although this has not been a simple nor problem-free transition. 
 
The findings of this paper are primarily based on secondary literature and thirteen 
interviews; giving a more unique and up-to-date insight on the issue. Given that the 
EU’s role in India has changed significantly overtime, it is important to acknowledge 
the evolution of the relationship chronologically with three time periods. This will help 
justify how the EU has transitioned from possessing a minor ‘leadership role’ in the 
earliest  stages of EU-India cooperation, to a more ‘supporting role’  and  ending, 
presently, as more of an ‘equal  partner’.  In brief, the first  phase  (1990-1999) 
recognises that although India established diplomatic relations with the European 
Economic Community as early as 1963, in the area of climate change very little EU-
India cooperation is visible prior to the 1990s, substantiating Goddeeris’s claim that 
                                                 
5 European Commission, “EU Action against Climate Change: helping developing countries 
cope with climate change”, Luxembourg,  Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2006, pp. 1-28. 
6 Ibid. BRIGG Paper 2/2012 
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the  relationship initially took a slow pace. 7  The second period  (2000-2009) 
commences on an important landmark date in EU-India relations, 2000, when the first 
ever EU-India Summit took place in Lisbon; climate change becoming a rising feature 
year on year as their relationship progressed to a Strategic Partnership. Finally, the 
third phase, covering the period from 2010 to present, features key developments in 
the partnership at the UNCCCs and the finalisation of India’s Twelfth Five Year Plan 
(released in April 2012). 
 
India’s position on climate change 
 
This section addresses  India’s  climate change policy on the domestic and inter-
national level.  
 
How worried should India be about climate change? 
 
India recognises that it is entering a phase of “increasing environmental stress”, as 
one of the world’s most vulnerable countries when it comes to climate change, 
acknowledging  the  huge  financial implications climate change could, and is 
already having, on its booming economy.8 The cost of climate change is huge on all 
fronts, from the unpredictable funds needed to recover from natural disasters, to the 
high cost of adaptation. For example, the increasingly vulnerable agricultural sector 
requires more investment from the Indian government to overcome the problem of 
rainfall unpredictability,  “rain-fed agriculture making up 70% of farmed land and 
increased drought having a devastating impact on India’s rural economy”.9 Finally, 
the inseparable link between development and environmental policy is brought into 
the spotlight when considering the consequences of climate change. As a nation 
recognised for its large and poor population,  climate change will create further 
water  and food insecurity, reduce  income stability and have serious health 
implications.  
 
Firstly, in terms of basic needs, “the receding of the Himalayan glaciers will affect 
water security across the entire northern part of the Indian subcontinent”, resulting in 
                                                 
7 Goddeeris, Idesbald, “EU-India Relations”, Policy Brief, no. 16, Centre for Global Governance 
Studies, Leuven University, Leuven, Belgium, May 2011, p. 4. 
8 See  Wright, Martin (ed.),  Monsoons and miracles:  India’s search for a sustainable future, 
Green Futures Special Publication, Beacon Press, January 2008. 
9 Slavin, Terry and Mehra, Malini, “Under the weather, climate change could suck India’s rivers 
and soil dry?”, in Wright, Martin (ed.), Monsoons and miracles: India’s search for a sustainable 
future, Green Futures Special Publication, Beacon Press, January 2008, p. 9. Emily Murrell 
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water shortages and lengthened periods of drought. 10 Further, concerning  food 
security,  the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)  suggested that 
climate change “will lead to huge crop losses and leave large patches of arable 
land unfit for cultivation”,  as  India’s resource base is attacked and the poorest, 
particularly those based in the most rural regions, left with limited food.11 Secondly, 
on the matter of rising income instability, natural disasters will result in “widespread 
habitat loss and population displacement”,  giving rise to climate migrants,  both 
within India and its vulnerable neighbouring countries (such as Bangladesh) who are 
also  highly susceptible to flooding.12 Fourthly,  concerning health, India is a ‘black 
carbon hotspot’, which, defined as “a component of soot and a potent climate-
forcing agent found in atmospheric brown clouds”, could severely deteriorate the 
health of (particularly poor) Indian people.13 
 
India’s contribution to climate change 
 
As is obvious from the aforementioned paragraph, India’s vulnerability to climate 
change impacts is high and this is due to worsen  as, unsurprisingly, the country’s 
absolute emissions are rising as it develops, and its emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) are “projected to increase by about 47% between now and 2020”.14 This is still, 
however, relatively low compared than for other developing nations, such as China, 
to whom India is often compared. India’s transport sector is highly polluting, energy 
intensive and the country is a high net importer of foreign oil.15 Further, India relies 
about “70% on coal and there are plans to build more coal-fired power plants”, 
although is coming to the realisation that it cannot depend on coal to this extent 
anymore. 16 Even  at present only “around 2% of India’s electricity comes from 
renewable sources”, this is likely to rise significantly throughout the next decade. 
                                                 
10 Fujiwara, Noriko and Egenhofer, Christian, “Understanding India’s Climate Agenda”, CEPS 
Policy Brief, no. 206, Brussels, February 2010, pp. 1-6.  
11  Saxena, Naresh,  “Climate Change perspectives from India”, Lasting Solutions for 
Development Challenges United Nations Development Programme Report,  New Delhi, 
November 2009, p. 40. 
12 Fujiwara and Egenhofer, op.cit., pp. 1-6. 
13 Luff, Peter and Whitfield, Robert, “Enhancing Cooperation”, Report of the High-Level India-
EU Dialogue, Action for a Global Climate Community,  July 2009, pp.  1-29, available at: 
www.climatecommunity.org. 
14 Rastogi,  Namrata Patodia, “Winds of Change: India’s Emerging Climate Strategy”, The 
International Spectator, vol. 46, no. 2, 2011, p. 127. 
15 Keating, Dave, “On the frontline of climate change”, European Voice, 2 February 2012, 
accessed 09/04/12, available at: http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/on-the-
frontline-of-climate-change/73454.aspx. 
16 Ibid. BRIGG Paper 2/2012 
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Climate diplomacy: explaining India’s negotiating position 
 
India’s position on climate change has long been dominated by its belief in a 
common but differentiated responsibility. By adhering to this principle, India “puts the 
burden of responsibility to address climate change on the shoulders of developed 
countries”, arguing that historically they have been the main contributors to GHG 
emissions in the atmosphere, and therefore should use their financial and technical 
resources to resolve the problem.17 This mind-set was  partially  overturned at the 
Durban UNFCC (2011) although the ethos still resonates in many of India’s actions. 
However, despite a difference in approach between the EU and India from an eco-
imperialistic  and equity perspective, there is a “strong environmental ethic 
embedded in Indian culture […which] remains unchanged despite increased 
prosperity”, and  this is reassuring to the EU as it searches for common ground.18 
However,  India’s rapid yet ‘uneven’ development, unmistakable from the 
persistence of poverty regardless of rising economic prosperity, has resulted in the 
country presenting a perplexing and somewhat contradictory position in climate 
change policy. This is partially attributed to its “schizophrenia of being both poor and 
rich at the same time”,  often  gaining  it the ‘victim label’. 19 However,  India still 
appears largely undecided as to whether it benefits more from presenting itself as 
“the weak and insecure India, or, the India of hope and confidence that seeks to 
stride the world stage”.20 This ultimately makes it a complex actor for the EU to work 
with, challenged by “the evolving nature of the tension between economic, social 
and environmental development” in India.21 
 
More recently the creation of The National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) 
has seen climate change rise up India’s domestic priority list, creating  renewed 
optimism in international and EU-India climate policy. So why is India taking this issue 
increasingly seriously? Martin Wright noted three key reasons for this development in 
                                                 
17 Patodia, Namrata,  “Why India Should Be Part of a Climate Deal”, Nature India.com, 3 
December 2009, accessed 21/02/12, available at: http://www.nature.com/nindia/2009/ 
091203/full/nindia.2009.348.html. 
18  Ghosh, Prodipto,  “Climate Change perspectives from India”, in Lasting Solutions for 
Development Challenges United Nations Development Programme Report, New Delhi, India, 
November 2009, p. 25. 
19 Mehra, Malini, “Climate Change: what are we waiting for?”, in M. Wright (ed.), Monsoons 
and miracles:  India’s search for a sustainable future, Green Futures Special Publication, 
Beacon Press, January 2008, p. 6. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Schunz and Belis, op.cit., p. 8. Emily Murrell 
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an insightful interview.22 Firstly, Indian policy makers have now realised that climate 
change is a major  issue on the diplomatic stage and given  their strong business 
minds do not want to miss out on a ‘money making’ opportunity; seduced by the 
idea of making a profit from the carbon trade for instance.23 Secondly, Mr Wright’s 
perspective  concurs with that of Schunz and Belis who maintain that India is 
increasingly conscious of its vulnerable status when it comes to climate change 
impacts,  thus is increasingly creating policies at the domestic level which 
acknowledge the broader international political debate on this issue.24 Thirdly, India’s 
energy concerns have made climate change a high politics issue, Martin Wright, for 
instance suggests that the potential for renewable energy in India has had a big 
impact on India’s approach; especially in the case of solar energy.25  
 
The evolution of India’s climate change policy on the domestic level 
 
Prior to the 1990s climate change seldom featured in Indian policy. This does not 
mean that it did not have environmental concerns, but rather that climate change 
was not a key priority in the country’s  overall political narrative.26 Thus, although 
climate change may not have been an independent policy area until more 
recently, GHG emission reduction and sustainable development are visible as 
indirect successes of broader environmental policy. For example, India’s commit-
ment to reducing deforestation, noticeable as early as the Forest Conservation Act 
(1980) and later the Forest Rights Act (2006), resulted in the “strict restricting and 
regulating […] the use of forest land for non-forest purposes without the prior 
approval of Central Government”, ensuring that forests, which act as carbon sinks for 
carbon emissions, were protected.27 
 
As Ian Thornton maintains, the last ten years have seen India’s confidence grow and 
its emergence as an economic power has given it an expanding role in creating 
environmental regulations. 28 For example, in the area of energy efficiency and 
security, the government is increasingly  investing in renewable energy, the New 
Renewable Energy Policy (2005), for instance, “promoting the adoption of sustain-
                                                 
22 Interview with Mr Martin Wright. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Schunz and Belis, op.cit., pp. 1-17. 
25 Interview with Mr Martin Wright, op.cit. 
26 Interview with Mr Ian Thornton. 
27 Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, “Forest Conservation”, accessed 
07/01/12, available at: http://moef.nic.in/modules/rules-and-regulations/forest-conservation. 
28 Interview with Mr Ian Thornton, op.cit. BRIGG Paper 2/2012 
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able and renewable energy sources by facilitating the speedy deployment of 
renewable technology through indigenous design, development and manufactur-
ing”.29 Further, concerning consumption, at the start of the second time period India 
created the Energy Conservation Act (2001) to reduce consumption in various 
sectors and later the Energy Conservation Building Code (2006) which saw the 
introduction of a “regulatory code designed to ensure energy efficiency in all 
buildings with above 500 KVA connected load or air-conditioned floor areas of over 
1000 square metres”.30 As an unintended consequence, this has also set a positive 
foundation for EU-India climate cooperation, such as for their Joint Declaration on 
Enhanced Cooperation in Energy (2012).  
 
More recently, in the third phase, “India has been successful in maintaining a steady 
decrease in its emissions intensity, an indicator of the decoupling of its economy and 
emissions”, revealing that, with political will, progress can be made quickly.31 Peter 
Luff revealed that progress is in part attributable to the new set of competent Indian 
Ministers and advisers who have successfully shaped policy, giving the example of Mr 
Jairam Ramesh, the Indian Minister of Environment and Forests, who helped break 
the Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV)  deadlock at the Cancun 
UNCCC in 2010.32 This new generation of ‘climate aware’ policymakers have helped 
strengthen the NAPCC, which  since 2008 “established a concrete framework to 
address climate in the domestic context”.33 It achieves this by setting targets across 
various key sectors, which relate to broader climate policy, with  eight  national 
missions,  including  “solar energy, energy efficiency, a sustainable habitat, water, 
sustaining the Himalayan ecosystem, ‘Green India,’ sustainable agriculture and 
sustainable knowledge for climate change”. 34 For example, in the solar energy 
mission, India’s Solar Mission sets the ambitious goal of “installing solar-power genera-
tion capacity of 20,000 MW by 2022”, thus addressing energy security and climate 
change concerns simultaneously and reducing the country’s reliance on more 
polluting energy sources, such as oil and coal.35 Further, the impact of these missions 
is large-scale; India’s National Mission on Energy Efficiency (applicable until 2015), for 
                                                 
29 Ghosh, “Climate Change perspectives from India”, op.cit., p. 19. 
30 Ibid., p. 20. 
31 Interview with Mr Peter Luff. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Rastogi, op.cit., p. 130. 
34 “Climate Change: Is India Inc. Prepared?”,  KPMG Study, India, 2008, p.  8, accessed 
23/03/12, available at: in.kpmg.com. 
35 Fujiwara and Egenhofer, op.cit., pp. 1-6. Emily Murrell 
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example, “is expected to reduce energy consumption by 5% and save about 100 
million tonnes of CO2 annually by 2015”.36 
 
Evidence: The EU’s leadership role in India’s climate policy 
 
As many commentators recognise, “the EU increasingly aspires to play a leading role 
in global politics, it engages itself in negotiations, cooperation schemes and conflict 
resolution processes”, climate change being a prime example of this.37 Leadership in 
itself is a broad and somewhat contested concept; it can be defined in a multitude 
of ways and is hard to quantify. Overall leadership can be considered “an asymmet-
rical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behaviour of 
others towards a certain goal, over a certain period of time”.38 Within this broader 
leadership role, the EU’s agenda, standard and target setting role will be discussed; 
important  sub-roles  within the broader concept of EU leadership.  Firstly, agenda 
setting considers the EU’s ability to raise the profile and salience of climate change in 
India, the European Commission increasingly attempting to act beyond its borders 
by  applying  regional processes  to shape policy  on a global scale.  Secondly,  the 
standard and target setting role will consider whether the EU has made India more 
ambitious in this regard.  
 
The EU as an agenda setter 
 
In terms of the EU’s agenda setting role, phase one in particular (the 1990s) was a 
period where there was a clear need for the  EU  to step up and take on this 
leadership role, which it demonstrated to some extent both on  a bilateral and 
multilateral level. Gauri Khandekar recognises  that the EU often leads in terms of 
making proposals and then getting India to agree to them, or at the very least, 
creating the need for action towards an agreement on a particular proposal.39 This is 
crucial, she added, as India  rarely  makes proposals, therefore it needs the EU to 
instigate a dialogue before it takes action.40 This has exacerbated substantially since 
the start of EU-India Summits in 2000, however EU-India bilateral contact has been 
notably less publicised than multilateral contact. On a multilateral level, the EU can 
to some extent be considered one (of many) international players which 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Bengtsson, Rikard and Elgström, Ole, “Conflicting Role Conceptions? The European Union in 
Global Politics”, Foreign Policy Analysis, vol. 8, no. 1, January 2012, pp. 93-108. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Interview with Ms Gauri Khandekar. 
40 Ibid. BRIGG Paper 2/2012 
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encouraged a greater profile for climate change in India’s action plans and national 
strategy documents. The EU’s role here is attributed, as Tim Gore stated,  to the 
Union’s ability to be one of the first to act in climate policy and having some of the 
most developed institutionalised policies in the world.41 However, the EU’s ability to 
lead beyond simply agenda setting,  but also in the  implementation  and 
enforcement of emissions cuts is still uncertain.42 
 
The EU as a target and standard setter 
 
Concerning the EU’s ability to set targets and standards, Gauri Khandekar argues 
that EU leadership is proven in this area by its success at setting ambitious targets and 
encouraging Indian negotiators to ‘aim high’ and not simply settle for lowest 
common denominator targets.43 In the first phase during which “several EU countries 
took the lead in establishing voluntary domestic emission reduction targets” at UN 
level, this encouraged India to take responsibility for its emissions and move towards 
setting its own targets. 44  Subsequently,  in phase two,  “India had success at 
maintaining a steady decrease in its emissions intensity”, the EU being one of the key 
actors who encouraged  India to set more ambitious targets.45 Graham Watson, 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP), attributes the EU’s success here to its 
ability to adopt a  persuasive  as opposed to dictating  approach.46 Despite some 
level of influence, the EU’s leadership potential has been significantly limited by its 
failure to meet its own emission reduction targets and set a better example, this Tim 
Gore maintains, is an important pre-requisite before India will cooperate further with 
the EU.47 
 
Evidence: the EU’s supporter role in India’s climate policy 
 
There is certainly potential for the Union to support India’s path towards sustainable 
growth and development given its vast technical expertise and financial resources. 
Negative publicity regarding the financial crisis in Europe often leads observers to 
                                                 
41 Interview with Mr Tim Gore. 
42 Schreurs, Miranda and Tiberghien, Yves, “Multi-Level Reinforcement: Explaining European 
Union Leadership in Climate Change Mitigation”, Global Environmental Politics, vol. 7, no. 4, 
November 2007, pp. 19-46. 
43 Interview with Ms Gauri Khandekar, op.cit. 
44 Schreurs and Tiberghien, op.cit., pp.19-46. 
45 Rastogi, op.cit., p. 127. 
46 Interview with Mr Graham Watson. 
47 Interview with Mr Tim Gore. Emily Murrell 
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overlook that, in the long term; the EU is still in a very capable position to financially 
support developing  partner countries. However,  India’s rising economic prosperity 
has caused  “substantial disagreement amongst  member states  concerning the 
financial contribution for developing country adaptation and mitigation measures”, 
and whether they still merit financial support.48 There are two sub-roles within the 
potential ‘supporter role’ for the EU which will now be discussed, supporting India via 
financial means or through technical expertise and information sharing. 
 
The EU as a financial supporter 
 
There is limited evidence of the EU as a financial supporter in the first phase; in part 
due to climate change being seen as a low policy priority in India during that period. 
The only exception worth noting is in the area of research, whereby, typically via the 
European Commission, the Union supported India financially when it financed or co-
financed research.  
 
The second time period  saw  the creation of a financial mechanism (2008),  an 
outcome of the 2005 EU-India Summit, which enhanced the EU’s financial supporter 
role. Although not created exclusively to finance climate change projects, the Delhi-
based Action Plan Support Facility “was created to generate financial support for 
implementing the EU-India Joint Action Plan”.49 Further, the third phase (2010) saw 
this financial mechanism evolve  as  climate change began to be considered 
independently from broader EU-India environmental concerns. 
 
The EU as a supporter through technical assistance and information sharing 
 
The EU’s supporter role in India through technical assistance and information sharing 
is an important consideration given that, according to Prasanta Biswal, India needs 
the EU’s help with technology innovation more than money. 50 India generally 
welcomes the support and intervention of external actors, stating at the High Level 
India-EU Dialogue (2009) that “by working well together we can achieve much more 
than by working separately”;  EU support to expand green technologies is thus 
                                                 
48 Groen, Lisanne and Niemann, Arne, “EU Actorness and effectiveness under political 
pressure at the Copenhagen climate change negotiations”, paper prepared for the Twelfth 
European Union Studies Association Conference, Boston, 3-5 March 2011, p. 12. 
49 Luff and Whitfield, op.cit., pp. 1-29. 
50 Interview with Mr Prasanta Biswal. BRIGG Paper 2/2012 
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appreciated.51 EU-India R&D collaboration complements India’s domestic efforts, for 
instance the GANGES Forum set up in 2010, which “comprised of the world’s leading 
environmental  scientists  of Indian origin [and]  was established to advise the 
Government of India on the countries environmental science agenda”.52  
 
There are several examples of India’s role as a supporter in the second phase. Firstly, 
the 2002 ‘Asia Pro Eco Programme’, which includes India as a target country, helped 
“strengthen the environmental dialogue between Asia and Europe through the 
exchange of policy information, technologies and best practice that promote more 
resource-efficient, market-driven and sustainable solutions  to urban  environmental 
problems in Asia”.53 As well as increasing the dialogue between the two actors it also 
began  the  process towards finding Asia-specific solutions; acknowledging Asia’s 
diversity and distinct needs. Secondly, the establishment of the EU-India Science and 
Technology Steering Committee in 2004 increased collaboration  by “establishing 
work programmes and […organising]  several EU-India thematic workshops”.54 For 
example,  the workshops covered “clean coal technologies and carbon capture 
storage, climate change research needs and renewable energy research and 
technology development”.55 Thirdly,  the EU has supported India technologically in 
the area of renewable energy, promoted  through the  November 2008 GEEREF 
initiative, an “innovative public  private partnership initiated  by the European 
Commission aiming  to transfer clean and renewable energy technologies to 
developing countries”.56 As Surabhi Rajagopal argues, initiatives like this have had a 
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Evidence: the EU’s role as India’s equal partner in climate policy 
 
The very concept of an ‘equal partnership’ suggests that the relationship is free of 
hierarchy and that players are able to sit on the same table, co-financing research 
and projects, under the label of equal ownership. The EU-India equal partnership is 
visible on both a bilateral and multilateral level and it is evident that as the two 
“enter a new phase in relations, getting the bilateral compact right appears a key 
precondition”,  before any joint projects or common strategies are finalised on a 
larger scale.58  
 
An equal partnership: on a bilateral level 
 
Firstly, on a bilateral level, the biggest landmark thus far has been the start of EU-India 
Summits, which “cover many aspects of the cooperation between the EU and India, 
including climate change and sustainable development [… and help] establish new 
priorities for the coming year”.59 Notable positive outcomes thus far include “the fifth 
Summit in 2004, which declared India and the EU to be Strategic Partners and in 2005 
when  a Joint  Action  Plan (JAP)  was agreed”.60 More recently, the twelfth summit 
showed “a fresh sign of the EU’s renewed political engagement towards its strategic 
partnership with India”,  with  the visible presence of  many  high-profile EU 
representatives,  challenging previous criticism  that the EU was ‘not taking the 
partnership seriously’ enough by only sending low rank officials to meetings.61 Beyond 
formal summits, in 2008, an important high-level dialogue was created in the form of 
an  EU-India roundtable discussion, considering “cooperation in the key field of 
sustainable development, in particular in the context of climate destabilisation as a 
natural fit for the India-EU partnership”. 62 These dialogues  focused on areas of 
disagreement and stagnation free of pressure and media attention. The focus on 
finding common goals and solutions, not simply EU solutions to Indian problems, has 
aided the move towards an equal partnership.  Peter  Luff  (a key  figure in the 
introduction of these discussions) observed India’s satisfaction at being listened to for 
the first time, appreciating the relaxed setting and option to stray from the agenda.63 
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An equal partnership in climate negotiations: on a multilateral level 
 
On a multilateral level, Gauri Khandekar suggests  there has been a visible 
disconnect and lack of synergy between the two actors.64 The lack of synergy was 
particularly visible prior to the Copenhagen UNCCC (2009),  when “India defined 
three basic national interests: no legally-binding emissions reduction target, no 
legally-binding peaking year for the country and a distinction between supported 
and unsupported mitigation actions by developing countries in respect of MRV”.65 
However, India consented to the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 and as a result committed to 
the Clean  Development  Mechanism (CDM), which was designed “to enable 
developed countries to meet their GHG reduction targets at a lower cost through 
projects in developing countries”. 66 Although  an opportunity for closer EU-India 
cooperation,  the CDM  in reality  saw more negotiations between individual EU 
member states and India taking place as opposed to united EU-India cooperation.67 
Further, it is likely to become more controversial in the third time period given that, 
“after December this year [2012] no new projects in India will be eligible for European 
financing through the CDM to encourage the funding to move to less developed 
countries such as Indonesia”.68 
 
Martin Wolf accuses India of possessing “a strong interest in securing an effective 
global agreement on climate change. However, it also possesses an interest in 
paying the smallest possible price for reaching that agreement”.69 However, the third 
time  period  saw  positive signs of these barriers being overturned.  For instance at 
Durban (2011), both “the EU and India played a key role in final negotiations that 
unlocked the pact on the last morning of the conference [… finding] the 
compromise that provided the basis to launch negotiations on a new global legal 
framework for climate action”.70 The success of the Union has thus been in climate 
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diplomacy,  particularly  concerning  conflict resolution and helping to promote a 
healthy BRIC-EU relationship. Overall, their “interaction and coordination within UN 
bodies is not robust”, which has to some extent reduced the EU’s influence, but the 
actors are increasingly fighting along the same policy lines, as equal partners.71  
 
An equal partnership in research 
 
Prior to phase two little existed regarding EU-India collaboration on research. There 
was notably the “EU-India JAP adopted in 2005 which included a significant research 
and an innovation dimension”.72 This inspired the first ever EU-India Ministerial Science 
Conference in 2007, which encompassed climate change and associated energy 
issues and successfully resulted,  for instance,  in “the implementation of regular 
coordinated calls for proposals between the EU and India in the fields of solar energy 
research.”73 Further, at the beginning of phase three, the ‘2010 Conference on India-
EU/Member State Partnership for a Strategic Roadmap in Research and Innovation’ 
saw discussions unfold on resource shortages, such as water shortages, worsened by 
climate change.74 A renewed acknowledgement of their enhanced cooperation 
and keenness to cooperate further in this area is visible under the framework of the 
EU-India Joint Declaration on Research and Innovation Cooperation,  of  February 
2012, which refers to “the vibrant and strong cooperation in science and technology 
between India, the EU and many of its member states, through a rich diversity of on-
going bilateral initiatives, programmes and schemes”.75 As Kirsten Bound highlighted 
in an interview, the amount of money being invested into  EU-India research has 
increased dramatically in recent years, opening the door for innovative and feasible 
solutions to climate change.76  
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Factors which stagnated progress from the EU’s side 
 
It has previously been acknowledged in this paper that the EU-India relationship is 
undergoing an evolutionary process, which allows for some degree of error as 
cooperation deepens. Stagnation and conflicts  faced in other areas of EU-India 
cooperation have undoubtedly had an impact on progress in climate change 
policy, for example over developments in the Emissions Trading Scheme and in the 
EU-India FTA negotiations. However, there are several factors, on the EU’s side, which 
have contributed to slow progress in cooperation in climate change policy.  
 
Firstly, the EU has been accused of not understanding India’s negotiating position, 
both in climate change negotiations specifically and as an actor on the global stage 
more generally. Commission President José Barroso’s own words described ”India’s 
journey over the last few decades as astounding; it is now a major world power, with 
impressive economic growth, a burgeoning middle class and a significant influence 
on its surrounding region and beyond”.77 However, the  Union  has  to some extent 
become obsessed with this image of India, forgetting that, in reality, “there are two 
Indias that exist in parallel; the image of an India of grinding poverty, a creaking 
socialist style economy and communal violence [… and] the burgeoning 
democracy with a booming market”.78 Thus, approaching India uniquely as a rising 
economic power and showing an “insufficient awareness and understanding among 
EU stakeholders about India’s development needs and challenges”, is too simplistic.79 
 
Secondly, partially  as a  result of the aforementioned difficulty,  the EU has had 
problems  trying  to understand India’s  complex  needs and priorities;  it  has  been 
accused of negotiating badly when trying to shape India’s climate policy. To begin 
with, “a major error was the decision to negotiate environmental issues, including 
climate change,  through confrontational negotiations instead of through other 
mechanisms that could foster unstinting cooperation”,  particularly relevant in the 
earliest stages of cooperation.80 This was, in part, a result of “few policymakers and 
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diplomats appearing to know what the strategic partnership actually entailed”.81 As 
a consequence, a more hierarchical, domineering and seemingly patronising 
negotiating position was adopted by the EU initially, with an unhealthy reliance on 
the path dependency model as it tried to encourage India to move on “a path of 
convergence towards Western norms and standards”. 82 As Kirsten Bound rightly 
states, path dependent models often fail because countries are looking to adapt 
best practices in a way that suits their unique development, the EU would have been 
better to acknowledge the diversity of climate solutions.83 A consequence was that, 
on some level, the EU curbed any hope of innovative and tailored solutions to India’s 
climate change challenges. Prasanta Biswal underlined that the EU should help India 
develop a unique model of solutions, not steer it based on its own very unique and 
specific experience.84 
 
Thirdly, the EU has disproportionately  focused  on ‘getting agreements’ when the 
main problem is the implementation of agreed policies and targets. As Peter Luff 
stated, the Indian government often fails to carry out its policies or meet targets and 
unless Indian Ministers are really keen to do something they do not pursue things very 
strongly.85 For example, despite a joint statement following the 2007 EU-India Summit, 
accentuating  India’s  commitment to R&D and solar energy programmes,  “the 
critical objectives have not progressed either far or fast enough”.86 The EU has thus, in 
a sense, overestimated  India’s  political will  to implement international and EU-
specific agreements. 
 
Factors which stagnated progress from India’s side 
 
Until recently, India has lacked a comprehensive understanding, firstly, of the EU’s 
scope and purpose and, secondly, of climate change as an independent issue. In 
the former case, Vogel reiterates that “ignorance about the EU is widespread”, with 
India unable to comprehend the Union’s complex and unique structure.87 Evidence 
of this came out of the High Level India-EU Seminars, whereby Indian negotiators 
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claimed that “it was difficult to know which of the many different EU institutions and 
directorates to deal with”.88 On the second point, India’s awareness of the climate 
change issue, Tim Gore  reiterated that  recognition of climate change is still very 
much  found only  at the elite level,  not at the general public or ground level  in 
India.89 Prasanta Biswal boldly stated that “no more than 10% of Indians know about 
climate change!”90 This has resulted in a lack of pressure or lobbying on the Indian 
government to fully implement climate change policies or deepen cooperation with 
the EU. 
 
Secondly, beyond the lack of understanding and awareness of the EU in India there 
is also the tenacious issue of its negative perception of the Union, Gauri Khandekar 
stating that “India is EU-sceptic, not Europe sceptic”.91 Prasanta Biswal stated,  for 
instance, that the EU should put its moral authority first and do more on its own side 
before it lectures others.92 Further, there is “a growing perception on the Indian side 
that the EU’s days as an economic world power are over”, reducing its partnership 
appeal.93 India consequently seeks many of the same partners as the EU and has 
often demonstrated “frustration that the EU’s Asia policy is much more focused on 
China”, making it feel sidelined and less important at a time when it is seeking global 
recognition and influence.94 These factors combined have resulted in India preferring 
bilateral cooperation with EU member states over cooperation with the EU as a single 
body. Peter Mandelson summarised the EU’s reaction, stating that, “just as Europe 
should take India seriously; I want India to take Europe seriously. I read recently in a 
report that Indians do not think very much about the EU. This is a shame if it is true”.95  
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Thirdly, India’s thin government structure and small staffing has made the progress 
towards making agreements slower.96 Gauri Khandekar reminds us that India only 
has approximately 700 diplomats, with only 4 being ‘Europe West’ diplomats dealing 
specifically with EU relations.97 Does this suggest that cooperation with the EU is still a 
low priority  for India even today?  Further, India’s  government  structure is often 
regarded as chaotic, for example  
Chintamani  Rao, chair of the Scientific Advisory Council to the Prime 
Minister, likens the Indian approach to science and innovation to the 
preparations for an Indian wedding. There is quite often chaos. So many 
people appear to be in charge that no one is actually in control.98  
 
Finally, the dominance of big businesses and corporate interests in India has had a 
massive influence, and not always a positive one, on climate policy according to 
Martin Wright.99 A KPMG study revealed that “the lack of stakeholder pressure on 
Indian companies is in sharp contrast with other countries where preferences of 
investors, employees, and customers typically convince companies to plan to 
reduce their carbon impact”, resulting in a ‘half-hearted’ commitment to meeting 
government targets.100 Further, Martin Wright adds that the significant diversity in the 
approaches of Indian companies towards meeting emission reduction targets makes 
it hard to monitor progress. 101  From the EU’s perspective this has exacerbated 
implementation problems  and pinpointed  where  additional  pressure needs to be 
applied. 
 
How to move forward: policy recommendations for the EU 
 
This  section  puts  forward five policy recommendations for the EU to successfully 
enhance cooperation with India in the area of climate policy. 
 
Accept the changing global order 
 
India’s rising influence has inevitably transformed the global order; its changing status 
is  considered  by some  a threat and by others an opportunity.  To  some extent 
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“Europe has a problem with the shifting geography of power in the world and with 
India’s emergence in particular”, which it recognises itself.102 Lena Kolarska-Bobinska 
(Deputy Chairwoman of the European Parliament’s Delegation to India) stated that 
“in Europe we think that we are big and important, we are not aware of how the 
situation in the world is changing”.103 However, in contrast, India clearly has realised 
its importance and therefore “will refuse to walk the course of an ‘old world order’ 
power”.104 This power shift should not be seen as a threat to the EU’s international 
leadership in climate policy, but an opportunity to cooperate further with a rising 
power to develop more innovative solutions to shared global problems. 
 
The importance of climate diplomacy 
 
Concerning climate diplomacy, Martin Wright states that “the EU should adopt a 
careful position, playing a game which works for both them and the political allies 
and partners they are working with”.105 As we enter further into this era of ‘global 
responsibilities’, climate change represents a pressing global problem which requires 
cross-border commitments. 106  Thus, for  the EU  and India to move towards a 
necessary equal partnership, the EU needs to “understand India and the factors that 
explain her foreign policy, as this  would greatly help the EU to develop a more 
harmonious relationship  with  the Asian power”  and  eliminate  any  negative 
perceptions of the Union.107  
 
Tailoring its approach, the EU should go regional in India 
 
At present, the EU typically approaches India as a single unit, when in reality it is not a 
monolith, its diversity being demonstrated by the many interest groups and states all 
of which have their own agenda  and priorities. 108  To overcome the policy 
implementation gap in India, the EU has to approach each Indian state or target 
group  differently.  In this regard, two interesting suggestions  came  out of  the 
interviews conducted. Firstly, Ian Thornton suggested  that  the EU  should adopt  a 
‘sub-federal’ approach as opposed to centralised approach in India, taking note of 
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the UK Department for International Development (DFID)  progress at  eliminating 
poverty in India by targeting poorer states rather than India as a whole unit.109 The EU 
should  therefore  recognise India’s diversity by expanding the number of regional 
projects, acknowledging the varying capabilities and needs of each state. Secondly, 
Graham Watson suggested an Indian state and EU member state partner scheme, 
as conveniently  the EU, like India, has twenty-seven member states,  therefore it 
would be logical to pair up each EU member state with an Indian state.110 
 
The importance of policy linkage 
 
As Rastogi rightly states, for the EU to play an active role in the formation of India’s 
climate change policy, it needs to persuade India “that action on climate change 
does not come at the expense of economic growth or development goals, and that 
these can, in reality, go hand in hand”.111 The EU therefore  needs to use policy 
linkage,  for example combining development and environmental initiatives,  to 
increase  the appeal of its climate change policies.  This would be effective, 
according to Prasanta Biswal, as psychologically it is better to talk to India about 
development (such as education or poverty related matters) than climate change 
specifically.112 It is preferable  to present the  economic benefits or development 
benefits as the first priority and combating climate change as the second ‘hidden’ 
goal.113 He added the example of India’s solar mission, arguing this was sold on its 
development and not climate change benefits, and it was therefore more successful 
and well implemented.114 
 
More contact, more progress 
 
Climate change policy will only see limited progress with annual EU-India Summits 
and  intermittent  dialogues. Thus,  to reduce policy fragmentation and 
implementation problems and “improve the EU-India strategic partnership, bilateral 
dialogues must be underscored and enriched”.115 The EU could take one or more of 
the following actions to address the aforementioned problem. Firstly,  it could 
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increase  the staffing size  of the EU Delegation to India to ensure more frequent 
communication and a better monitoring of progress. Secondly, the actors should try 
to organise  more regular face-to-face contact to strengthen the partnership; 
“reciprocal visits from Indian politicians to Brussels would increase the EU’s visibility in 
India and create a better understanding of each other’s role in the new developing 
global architecture”.116 The shocking reality is that in 2011, “four years into her term, 
EU delegation head Daniele Smadja has yet to meet Congress president Sonia 
Gandhi” in person, highlighting the gravity of this problem.117 Thirdly, contact could 




This paper has discussed the EU’s role in the formation of India’s climate change 
policy, demonstrating that  the India-EU  relationship  is complex and constantly 
evolving; especially concerning climate change policy. India still faces significant 
development and economic challenges as well as difficulties adjusting to its new 
status as a rising global power. The EU should try to understand that climate change 
is just one of many priorities for the Indian government, and that,  despite its 
increasing assertiveness, it still faces many structural and political issues which can 
delay  policy  implementation.  Meanwhile, India should recognise  that  “with 
increasing power, comes increasing responsibility”,  thus it must try to fully 
comprehend the impact of its actions, or lack of action, especially  concerning 
shared global problems.119 Further, in terms of priorities, it does not need to focus 
exclusively on economic development or environmental policy; “as it develops it 
can ensure that it does so in a sustainable, low carbon way”.120 A challenge the EU 
persistently faces when trying to deepen climate change cooperation with India is 
that where there is scope for EU-India cooperation, there is equally scope for India to 
cooperate with other actors, such as its important neighbour China.121 India is thus in 
an increasingly powerful position to ‘pick and mix’ whom it wants to work with or 
retain sovereignty by keeping policy at the domestic level. However, this should not 
be disconcerting for the EU, it simply needs to develop a greater understanding of 
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India’s needs and adapt its negotiating position accordingly. From now onwards, the 
EU’s priority should be to sustain the political momentum by “raising its game in India: 
being more present, visible and coherent”.122 
 
The time for negotiation and stagnation in climate policy is running out; “India and 
Europe [have] to work together towards restructuring global political and economic 
structures, within the context of tackling climate destabilisation”.123 Observers focus 
disproportionately on the negative aspects of their relationship, however,  as  Ruth 
Katumurri rightly stated, the barriers are less now than in the past and the scope for 
cooperation in climate change policy is greater than ever before.  124 The reality is 
that just as the EU needs India, India needs the EU as well. This should be reason 
enough for the two actors to strengthen their relationship in this policy area. As 
“interdependence and inclusiveness are the catchwords of the new global order in 
which both the EU and India must co-exist”,  climate change policy presents the 
ultimate test to the solidarity of their relationship.125 With political will, determination 
and compromise, there is no doubt that India and the EU can work together to 
reduce the disastrous implications of climate change; the EU as a body uniting 
European countries and India as a key voice of the BRIC countries and developing 
nations.  
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